Even after controlling for other observable factors, reciprocal deposits are associated with higher bank risk as measured by the probability of failure and the Zscore. These results are consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis and reject the risk substitution hypothesis.

Standard early warning models to predict bank failures cannot be estimated during periods of few or zero failures, precluding any updating of such models during times of good performance. Here we address this problem using an alternative approach, forecasting the simple leverage ratio...

Economists have generally ignored the notion that perceived time may differ from clock time. Borrowing from the behavioral psychology literature, we investigate the case of time compression whereby perceived time passes more quickly than actual time. A framework is presented to embed time...

Motivated by the debate over similarities between the current and previous financial crises, logit estimates reveal significantly changed linkages between observable financial ratios and probabilities of subsequent bank failure using U.S. data from the 1980s and 2008.

This paper examines foreign institutional investors' portfolio allocation and performance in US securities. We test how information immobility, proxied by cultural and geographical distance between the investors' home markets and the US, influences portfolio strategies. Consistent with...

Recent international mergers have potentially revived interest in a long-standing concern of U.S. courts that, under certain conditions, a conglomerate that buys from and sells products to its intermediary supplier may be able to profitably leverage its downstream market power to restrict...

Expanded public availability of U.S. banking data has prompted a need to reexamine end-of-quarter window dressing. We find substantial heterogeneity in the pattern of window dressing across banks and products, not all of which can be explained as customerinitiated, and some of which is...

Contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year. This paper characterizes equilibrium effort, both individual and aggregate, in a general parameterization of such repeated contests.

This study provides new evidence regarding reciprocal brokered deposits (RBDs), regulatory responses, and bank risk, contributing to prior studies in four ways. First, using updated financial Call Report data and bank failure data through 2012, we reexamine the moral hazard hypothesis that banks...