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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009817020
The primary pro-competitive justification for multiple principals to hire a common bidding agent is efficiency. The efficiency gained by doing so increases the advantage of the common bidding agent. Almost common value auction theory predicts that an advantaged bidder is able to reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597464
The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency. Our empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses winning bids. Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder but also paid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922479
The primary pro-competitive justification for multiple principals to hire a common bidding agent is efficiency. The efficiency gained by doing so increases the advantage of the common bidding agent. Almost common value auction theory predicts that an advantaged bidder is able to reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195372
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009020498
The primary pro-competitive justification for multiple principals to hire a common bidding agent is efficiency. The efficiency gained by doing so increases the advantage of the common bidding agent. Almost common value auction theory predicts that an advantaged bidder is able to reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185986