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New Hampshire Effect : Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests
Mago, Shakun D. - 2018
Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924302
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The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests
Irfanoglu, Zeynep B.; Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014
This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884877
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Divided Loyalties or Conditional Cooperation? An experimental study of contributions to multiple public goods
McCarter, Matthew W.; Samak, Anya C.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
It is common in organizational life to be simultaneously involved in multiple collective actions. These collective actions may be modeled using public good dilemmas. The developing social dilemma literature has two perspectives – the “divided loyalties” and “conditional cooperation”...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817440
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The Attack and Defense Games
Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2019
The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012864020
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Three-Player Trust Game with Insider Communication
Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2012
among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant … amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases … cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096059
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A Laboratory Study of a Multi-Level Trust Game with Communication
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Department of Economics, McMaster University - 2009
This experimental study explores how communication influences efficiency, trust and trustworthiness in a small group … when one member is left out of communication. To study this problem, we introduce a novel three-player trust game where … treatment with no communication shows that on average players 1 and 2 send significant amounts and player 3 reciprocates even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528460
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Three-Player Trust Game with Insider Communication
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
among three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send significant … amounts and the third player reciprocates. Allowing insider communication between the second and the third players increases … cooperation between these two. Interestingly, there is an external effect of insider communication: the first player who is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817432
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Multi-Level Trust Game with “Insider” Communication
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2009
This experiment studies the internal and external effects of communication in a multilevel trust game. In this trust … allocation among the three players. The baseline treatment with no communication shows that the first and second players send … significant amounts and the third player reciprocates. When we allow communication only between the second and third players, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556051
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Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-Based Interaction
Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - 2015
We observed reports of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotions activated after interactions in the Trust game. Our analyses reveal that activation of 20 emotional states following trust-based interaction is better explained by predictions derived from a multi-dimensional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038024
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Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction
Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the “Recalibrational Model” or Valence Models. According to the Recalibrational Model, new information about trust-based interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817391