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This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008869386
This study provides a unified theoretical and experimental framework in which to compare three canonical types of competition: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817416
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winnertake- all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556048
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winnertake- all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531898
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008840848
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003973387
This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940281
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012289868
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008441471
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130476