[This article is a revised and condensed version of Jesse Fried and Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798185]The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to adopt clawback policies for recovering certain types of excess pay — overpayments resulting from errors in...

We explain why firms should have a policy requiring directors to recover “excess pay” – payouts to executives resulting from an error in compensation metrics (such as inflated earnings). We then analyze the clawback policies voluntarily adopted by S&P 500 firms as of 2010 and find that...

I argue that executive equity pay in U.S. public firms is undesirable and should be replaced with cash awards for attaining long-term performance criteria.Paying top executives in equity (stock and stock options) is the most significant reform of executive compensation in our generation,...

This Article is the first academic study to systematically analyze the overall sensitivity of executive compensation to stock buybacks. Specifically, my analysis of executive compensation arrangements of CEOs included in the S&P 500 Index reveals that buybacks can enhance a record high portion...

This paper is the first academic endeavor to analyze the efficacy and transparency of current stock ownership policies (SOPs) in U.S. public firms. SOPs generally require managers to hold some of their firms’ stock for the long term. Following the 2008 financial crisis, firms universally...

In this book chapter, I show that, while the U.S. systems relies on factors that are not determined by regulation, which I call market forces, to shape sophisticated investor protection standards, Israel prescribes such arrangements by the heavy hand of the regulator. I substantiate my argument...