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Legal origins
Shleifer, Andrei; Glaeser, Edward L. - In: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators, (pp. 209-240). 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767631
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Coase versus the Coasians
Shleifer, Andrei; Glaeser, Edward L.; Johnson, Simon - In: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators, (pp. 177-208). 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767636
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Salience theory of judicial decisions
Bordalo, Pedro; Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225021
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An activity-generating theory of regulation
Schwartzstein, Joshua; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The journal of law & economics 56 (2013) 1, pp. 1-38
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009790770
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Legal origins
Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001594673
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Coase versus the Coasians
Glaeser, Edward L.; Johnson, Simon; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The quarterly journal of economics 116 (2001) 3, pp. 853-899
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001601250
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Toward a theory of legal reform
Hay, Jonathan R. - In: European economic review : EER 40 (1996) 3, pp. 559-567
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001205252
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Legal Origins
Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The quarterly journal of economics 117 (2002) 4, pp. 1193-1229
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001763008
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Legal origins
Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001579607
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Legal Origins
Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - 2021
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the need for protection and control of law enforcers by the state. This perspective explains why, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216846