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The Differences between Hostile & Friendly Takeovers

Morck, Randall - 2014

Compared to an average Fortune 500 firm, a target of a hostile takeover is smaller, older, has a lower Tobin's Q, invests less of its income, and is growing more slowly. The low Q seems to be an industry-specific rather than a firm-specific effect. In addition, a hostile target is less likely to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063766

Alternative mechanisms for corporate control

Morck, Randall; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000754890

Alternative mechanisms for corporate control

Morck, Randall - In: The American economic review 79 (1989) 4, pp. 842-852

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001074277

Large shareholders and corporate control

Shleifer, Andrei - In: Journal of political economy 94 (1986) 3, pp. 461-488

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001012740

Characteristics of hostile and friendly takeover targets

Morck, Randall; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. - 1987

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000732177

Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control

Morck, Randall - 1988

We examine performance and management characteristics of Fortune 500 firms experiencing one of three types of control change: internally precipitated management turnover, hostile takeover, and friendly takeover. We find that firms experiencing internally precipitated management turnover perform...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476534