We explore the role of private information in bilateral matching and bargaining. Our model is a replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002), but with private information. A simple necessary and sufficient condition on the parameters of the model for existence of equilibrium with entry is obtained. As...

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and each unit of time continuums of new buyers...

Abstract We study a market search equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty, private information and heterogeneus beiefs. Traders initially start out optimistic and then update their beliefs based on their matching experience in the market, using the Bayes rule. It is shown that all separating...

We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in public procurement auctions. Our focus is on Montreal’s asphalt industry, where there have been allegations of bid rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding and bribes...

We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in public procurement auctions. Our focus is on Montreal's asphalt industry, where there have been allegations of bid rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding and bribes to...