This is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged...

The set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix game is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the number of different Pareto optimal sets of each cardinality; we establish asymptotic...

The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what...

The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered.

The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered

We consider abstract exchange mechanisms wherein individuals submit "diversified" offers in m commodities, which are then redistributed to them. Our first result is that if the mechanism satisfies certain natural conditions embodying "fairness" and "convenience" then it admits unique prices, in...

An overview is given of the utilization of strategic market games in the development of a game theory based theory of money and financial institutions.

We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism M_G that satisfies some natural conditions of "fairness" and "convenience."...

An overlapping generations model of an exchange economy is considered, with individuals having a finite expected life-span. Conditions concerning birth, death, inheritance and bequests are fully specified. Under such conditions, the existence of stationary Markov equilibrium is established in...