This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that … between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment …

costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general cost …

This study investigates hospitals' dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a … prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past average costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic … spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price …

This study investigates hospitals' dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a … prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past average costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic … spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price …

This study investigates hospitals' dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a … prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past average costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic … spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price …

This study investigates hospitals’ dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a … prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past average costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic … spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price …