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We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is veri?able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876378
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791404
separating equilibrium can emerge, depending on the degree of altruism, characterised as very low, low, high and very high. i …) For very low altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is distorted upwards and downwards respectively …; the efficient type makes a positive profit. ii) For low altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129612
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is contractible (dimension 1) and one dimension is not contractible (dimension 2). We show that the optimal incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328472
separating equilibrium can emerge, depending on the degree of altruism, characterised as very low, low, high and very high. i …) For very low altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is distorted upwards and downwards respectively …; the efficient type makes a positive profit. ii) For low altruism the quantity of the efficient and inefficient types is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661600
framework. Patients differ in severity within a DRG. Providers are to some extent altruistic. For low altruism, a downward … spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418156
framework. Patients differ in severity within a DRG. Providers are to some extent altruistic. For low altruism, a downward … spiral of prices is possible which induces hospitals to focus on low-severity cases. For high altruism, dynamic price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412307
Waiting times for elective (non-emergency) treatments are a key health policy concern in several OECD countries. This study describes common measures on waiting times across OECD countries from administrative data. It focuses on common elective procedures, like hip and knee replacement, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011007208
Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU which recently passed a new law on a patient's right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261607
We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002563