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The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors

Baumol, William J.; Sidak, J. Gregory - 2009

inputs to its competitors in the market for final telecommunications products at a price that reflects all its costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123520

Sidak, J. Gregory - 2015

Google distributes proprietary applications for its open-source Android mobile operating system (OS) free of charge. Some of those applications (apps) are offered together as a suite of apps known as Google Mobile Services (GMS). Manufacturers of mobile devices can agree, pursuant to Google's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032220

The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors : Rejoinder and Epilogue

Sidak, J. Gregory; Baumol, William J. - 2009

In this piece, we respond to comments on our earlier essay on access pricing in telecommunications on the efficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034217

Exporting Telecommunications Regulation : The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing

Rohlfs, Jeffrey H.; Sidak, J. Gregory - 2009

Since 1997, the U.S. government has attempted to use the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on telecommunications … services as a vehicle for exporting American principles of telecommunications regulation to other nations. The United States … took the position in 1997 that the WTO telecommunications agreement requires its signatory nations to follow the practices …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034286

The Meaning of Frand, Part II : Injunctions

Sidak, J. Gregory - 2018

Under what conditions may the holder of standard-essential patents (SEPs) seek to enjoin an infringing implementer without breaching the SEP holder's contract with the standard-setting organization (SSO) to provide access to those SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms? I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918525

Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers

Hausman, Jerry A.; Sidak, J. Gregory; Singer, HalJ. - In: American Economic Review 91 (2001) 2, pp. 302-307

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821024

Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators

Singer, Hal J.; Sidak, J. Gregory - In: Review of Network Economics 6 (2007) 3, pp. 372-396

This paper argues that a cable operator with sufficient market power in the downstream multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) market can deny access to unaffiliated programmers, resulting in an upstream programming rival's exit or impaired dynamic efficiency. Further, market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005685412

Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability

Sidak, J. Gregory - 2009

A quot;price squeeze,quot; or quot;margin squeeze,quot; is a theory of antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act that concerns a vertically integrated monopolist that sells its upstream bottleneck input to firms that compete with the monopolist's production of a downstream product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012766481

Did Separating Openreach from British Telecom Benefit Consumers?

Sidak, J. Gregory - 2014

In 2005, Ofcom, then telecommunications regulator in the United Kingdom, implemented functional separation of British …, telecommunications investment, customer satisfaction, and measures of the United Kingdom's global competitiveness in telecommunications …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045955

Maximizing the U.S. Postal Service’s Profits from Competitive Products

Sidak, J. Gregory - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936983