[fre] Nous étudions l'incidence de l'impôt sur les sociétés en équilibre général dans le cadre d'un modèle à 2 ou 4 secteurs. En économie fermée, le capital supporte l'essentiel de la taxe. En économie ouverte, lorsqu'on suppose que le capital est un facteur mobile et pas le travail,...

<alinea/> This article contributes to the debate about the reform of the French local business tax. It casts light on an argument in favour of its replacement by a tax based on the value added, an argument that was apparently overlooked. For this purpose, it uses the user cost of the production factors,...

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasilinear in consumption. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed....

We investigate how the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule is modified when taxpayers can evade taxation by emigrating. We consider two symmetric countries with Maximin governments. Workers choose their labor supply along the intensive margin. The skill distribution is continuous, and, for...

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on...

This article studies the incidence of the corporation income tax in a general equilibrium setting with 2 or 4 sectors. In closed economy, most of the tax is borne by capital. The opposite conclusion is obtained in open economy provided capital is mobile and labour is immobile : labour bears...

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasilinear in income. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We...

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on...

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasilinear in income. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We...

We investigate how the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule is modified when taxpayers can evade taxation by emigrating. We consider two symmetric countries with Maximin governments. Workers choose their labor supply along the intensive margin. The skill distribution is continuous, and, for...