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We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labor market. Both pooling and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350036
In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345037
A state which does not desire an arms race may nevertheless acquire new weapons if it believes another state will acquire them. If each state assigns some arbitrarily small probability to the event that the other state has a dominant strategy to acquire more weapons, then a multiplier effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350034
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163089
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163099
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005697959
We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labour market. Both pooling and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771126
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361121
We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labour market. Both pooling and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797442
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160059