We examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources ("guns"). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from...

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...

Contest functions (alternatively, contest success functions) determine probabilities of winning and losing as a function of contestants’ eort. They are used widely in many areas of economics that employ contest games, from tournaments and rent-seeking to conflict and sports. We first examine...

We examine a conflictual setting in which adversaries cannot contract on an enforcement variable (arms) and where the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. We show that, as the future becomes more important in this...

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two...

In this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more generally, the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance or the formal organizations and institutions that help define and enforce property rights, and norms, or the informal arrangements in settling potential...

We construct a model of conflict and trade to study the consequences of interstate disputes over contested resources (land, oil, water or other resources) for arming, welfare and trade flows. Different trade regimes imply different costs of such disputes in terms of arming. Depending on world...

In this chapter, we examine how some of the main results in international trade theory fare when we abandon the traditional assumption of third-party enforcement of property rights. Without such enforcement, countries arm and exercise power to secure resources used in production or to secure the...

Contest functions (alternatively, contest success functions) determine probabilities of winning and losing as a function of contestants' effort. They are used widely in many areas of economics that employ contest games, from tournaments and rent-seeking to conflict and sports. We first examine...

How do the outcomes of international wars affect domestic social change? In turn, how do changing patterns of social identification and domestic conflict affect a nation's military capability? Models that link structural variables, power politics, and the individuals that constitute states are...