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Technical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms"
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248609
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What to Put on the Table
Skreta, Vasiliki; Figueroa, Nicolas - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359273
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Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359295
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Optimal Auctions with General Distributions
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708363
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On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708467
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Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708615
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Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708620
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Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708624
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Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms
Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708646
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The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design
Figueroa, Nicolas; Skreta, Vasiliki - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827988