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We study social dilemmas in (quasi‐) continuous‐time experiments, comparing games with different durations and termination rules. We discover a stark qualitative contrast in behavior in continuous time as compared to previously studied behavior in discrete‐time games: cooperation is easier...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011235018
We study interactions with different durations and termination rules in a (quasi) continuous-time prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We find that cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones; end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391746
When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010609956
When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651688
When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399849
In an experiment on the repeated prisoner's dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012882599
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350640
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009504749
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772251
In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805575