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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and …-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms … performance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
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Discretion Over Bonus Timing
Block, Sidney; Opitz, Saskia; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo - 2023
We study bonus assignments by managers who have discretion over bonus timing, analyzing extensive personnel records and linked survey data from a multinational firm. We find that – even though the bonus system is intended to provide timely rewards – managers award most bonuses at the end of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254083
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Discretion over Bonus Timing
Block, Sidney; Opitz, Saskia; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo - 2023
We study bonus assignments by managers who have discretion over bonus timing, analyzing extensive personnel records and linked survey data from a multinational firm. We find that – even though the bonus system is intended to provide timely rewards – managers award most bonuses at the end of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255008
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Multitasking and the benefits of objective performance measurement : evidence from a field experiment ; conference paper
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013 - Preliminary version
We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the … outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee’s pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822413
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835229
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Incentives and Cooperation in Firms: Field Evidence
Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
importance of individual, team, and company performance for compensation, we find a significant positive relation between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922969
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How to Hire Helpers? Evidence From a Field Experiment
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Reggiani, Tommaso; … - Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and … - 2013
How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2,859 students to help at the 'ESA Europe 2012' conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662714
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When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments
Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 188-191
We investigate the relationship between tournament prices and effort choices in the presence of favoritism. High tournament prizes can decrease agents’ effort supply when the choice of the winner is not perfectly objective but affected to some extent by personal preferences of an evaluator.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041567