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In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317662
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539675
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968410
performance incentive schemes such as profit-sharing or team incentives. The appropriate approach depends on each company's unique …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012296350
Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906086
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738
the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334129
multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to … span of control is larger and incentives are distorted towards more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873585