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Wage premia for newly hired employees : theory and evidence

Kampkötter, Patrick; Sliwka, Dirk - 2011

We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees. We show in a formal model that when employees care for wages as well as match-specific utility, incumbents earn less than new recruits if and only if firm-specific human capital is not too important. The existence and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009232346

Employee Identification and Wages : On the Economics of "Affective Commitment"

Kampkötter, Patrick - 2020

We study the role of employees' identification to the employer for wage growth. We first show in a formal model that identification implies countervailing effects: Employees with higher identification are more valuable as they exert higher efforts, but have weaker bargaining positions, and less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824439

Employee identification and wages : on the economics of "Affective Commitment"

Kampkötter, Patrick; Petters, Lea M.; Sliwka, Dirk - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 188 (2021), pp. 608-626

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012658762

Employee identification and wages: on the economics of "affective commitment"

Kampkötter, Patrick; Petters, Lea M.; Sliwka, Dirk - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012271435

Bonus payments and reference point violations

Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2010

We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941775

Management changes, reputation, and "big bath" : earnings management

Nieken, Petra; Sliwka, Dirk - In: Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS 24 (2015) 3, pp. 501-522

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349322

Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2002

In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539675

On the use of nonfinancial performance measures in management compensation

Sliwka, Dirk - 2001

It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539694

The contribution of managers to organizational success : evidence from German soccer

Hentschel, Sandra; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2014

We study the impact of managers on the success of professional soccer teams using data from the German "Bundesliga". We … evaluate the performance impact of individual managers by estimating regression models that include both team and manager fixed … effects, where we are exploiting the high turnover of managers between teams to disentangle the managers' contributions. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010417962

Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions : theory and field evidence

Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - 2011

mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for managers who decide upon promotion. Second, we analyze matched employer … indeed substantially higher when managers receive performance-related pay or participate in gain sharing plans. -- incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009232290