We formulate an evolutionary learning process with trembles for static games of incomplete information. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time supporting the notion of Bayesian equilibrium....

This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight...

The paper considers a very simple collective decision problem: The partition of a pie of size 1 among n agents. This is a social choice problem of maximal conflict with possibilities to compromise. It is thus a case which is 'unsolvable' by social choice theory, a case where the core of majority...

The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.

An uncertain and not just risky situation may be modeled using so-called belief functions assigning lower probabilities to events, that is, to sets of possible outcomes. In this paper we introduce an axiom of consistency by which we extend the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory to...

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcome p[subscript c] and the bilateral bargaining outcome p[subscript b] are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost...

The so-called Allais Paradox (Allais (1953)) has been interpreted as a violation of the independence axiom of Savage (1954). Considering the standard experiments performed this inference is questionable. Rather the paradoxical behavior represents evidence against the expected utility hypothesis...

This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss...

Capacities (monotone, non-additive set functions) have been suggested to describe situations of uncertainty. We examine the question of how to define the product of two independent capacities. In particular, for the product of two belief functions (totally monotone capacities), there is a unique...

This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficient conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning sequences to be sequential equilibria.