We present evidence against the standard assumptions that social preferences are stable and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. We find evidence that measures of social preferences can affect subsequent behavior. Researchers often measure social preferences by posing dictator...

We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects...

We design an induced value choice experiment where the objects are valued according to only a single attribute with a continuous measure. Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice objects but they can reduce their imperfect perception with cognitive effort. Subjects are given a choice...

It is well-known that laboratory subjects often do not play mixed strategy equilibria games according to the theoretical predictions. However, little is known about the role of cognition in these strategic settings. We conduct an experiment where subjects play a repeated hide and seek game...

Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment designed to capture this feature of communication. The messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve...

We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic sophistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subject's cognitive resources that are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects are placed under a large cognitive...