"Laboratory experiments have generally supported the fundamental theorem that, in classical property rights environments, noncooperative behavior in large group markets yields efficient social outcomes. Experiments, however, regularly fail to support the game theoretic prediction of...

In this paper we report the results of additional exchange ultimatum game experiments conducted at the same time as the exchange ultimatum game experiments reported in Hoffman et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), pp. 346–380, 1994). In these additional experiments, we use...

This chapter defines various social distances as the degree of reciprocity that people believe is inherent within a social interaction. The greater the social distance, or isolation, between a person and others, the weaker is the scope for reciprocal relations. This chapter conjecture that the...

The current cultural norms with regard to sharing, cooperation, trust, and punishment are the result of 23 million years of evolution and adaptation. During most of those 23 million years, humans lived in small interactive groups and developed behaviors and strategies to promote cooperation and...

The results demonstrated in this chapter quite clearly the impact of property rights on the shared expectations about appropriate proposer behavior in both ultimatum and dictator games. If the game is presented as division (which by one definition means literally to separate into equal parts by...