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Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self‐interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014485897
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824110
No governor has sufficient capabilities to govern single-handedly; all governors rely on agents, and thus become principals. The "governor's dilemma" results from the tradeoff between agent competence and principal control. Competent agents are difficult to control because their policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011820081
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal-agent (PA) theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the intermediary (agent) has an informational advantage over the governor (principal), which it can exploit for shirking, slacking or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907275
1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008728017