Showing 1 - 10 of 165
Conventional wisdom suggests that nominal, demand-side shocks have only temporary effects on real macroeconomic magnitudes and that the duration of their effects depends on the degree of nominal inertia. It is also argued that, in the absence of unit roots, temporary supply-side shocks also have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293971
Conventional wisdom suggests that nominal, demand-side shocks have only temporary effects on real macroeconomic magnitudes and that the duration of their effects depends on the degree of nominal inertia. It is also argued that, in the absence of unit roots, temporary supply-side shocks also have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736646
In the German unemployment insurance system, Integration Agreements (IA) are mandatory contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, jointly signed by the latter and the caseworker. IAs stipulate rights and obligations but are generally perceived as instruments to control search...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251531
In the standard macroeconomic search and matching model of the labor market, there is a tight link between the quantitative effects of (i) aggregate productivity shocks on unemployment and (ii) unemployment benefits on unemployment. This tight link is at odds with the empirical literature. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625891
In the standard macroeconomic search and matching model of the labor market, there is a tight link between the quantitative effects of (i) aggregate productivity shocks on unemployment and (ii) unemployment benefits on unemployment. This tight link is at odds with the empirical literature. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012111816
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341
We extend the standard evaluation framework to allow for interactions between individuals within segmented markets. An individual's outcome depends not only on the assigned treatment status but also on (features of) the distribution of treatments in his market. To evaluate how the distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273977
We extend the standard evaluation framework to allow for interactions between individuals within segmented markets. An individual's outcome depends not only on the assigned treatment status but also on (features of) the distribution of the assigned treatments in his market. To evaluate how the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277334
This paper analyses theoretically and empirically how employment subsidies should betargeted. We contrast measures involving targeting workers with low incomes/abilities andtargeting the unemployed under the criteria of "approximate welfare efficiency" (AWE)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862794