-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

-based cost games. We demonstrate that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an … associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized … DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 and the core … core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person case. We prove that in any four-person game … and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 …

-based cost games. We demonstrate that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an … associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized … DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we …

-assignment optimization problems. It is known that for permutation games the bargaining set and the core coincide, consequently, the kernel is … a subset of the core. We prove that for permutation games the kernel is contained in the least core, even if the latter … is a lower dimensional subset of the core. By means of a 5-player permutation game we demonstrate that, in sense of the …