-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

-based cost games. We demonstrate that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an … associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized … DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we …

that although the game is not convex its core is always non-empty. Furthermore we provide a painting algorithm for large …

-assignment optimization problems. It is known that for permutation games the bargaining set and the core coincide, consequently, the kernel is … a subset of the core. We prove that for permutation games the kernel is contained in the least core, even if the latter … is a lower dimensional subset of the core. By means of a 5-player permutation game we demonstrate that, in sense of the …

is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationships between these … over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors), lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and … extreme core points. As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational payoff set, also the …

coalitions determine both the core and the nucleolus in monotonic games whenever the core is non-empty. We show how these two …