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Risk Aversion, Prospect Theory, and Strategic Risk in Law Enforcement: Evidence From an Antitrust Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Le Coq, Chloé; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; … - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2008
In this paper we investigate the effects of risk preferences and attitudes towards risk on optimal antitrust enforcement policies. First, we observe that risk aversion is negatively correlated with playersÂ’ proclivity to form a cartel, and that increasing the level of fines while reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651522
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Divide et Impera. Optimnal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Econometric Society - 2004
agent that defects from fines and from other agents' punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329023
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Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring
Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection … before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment … collusion. To test this subtle prediction we implement in the laboratory an indefinitely repeated Cournot game with noisy price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106
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Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages and Criminalization
Marvão, Catarina M. P.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a recent phenomenon that we name EU ``leniency inflation", whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many, and sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221273
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On Interdependent Supergames : Multimarket Contact, Concavity and Collusion
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1999
collusion. It may even make it sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014193963
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On Interdependent Supergames : Multimarket Contact, Concavity and Collusion
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1999
collusion. It may even make it sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194052
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Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion: on Extremal Equilibria of Interdependent Supergames
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1996
are doing in others. In this case multimarket contact always facilitates collusion, and may make it sustainable in all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649430
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Prisoners' Other Dilemma
Blonski, Matthias; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
's Dilemma (repeated oligopolies, relational-contracting models, etc.). We illustrate our main result for collusion equilibria in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887
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Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498010
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Trust, Salience and Deterrence: Evidence from an Antitrust Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloe; … - 2011
We present results from a laboratory experiment identifying the main channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter organized economic crime. The absolute level of a fine has a strong deterrence effect, even when the exogenous probability of apprehension is zero. This effect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320242