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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2008
: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419507
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Trust and Deterrence
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084601
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Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616
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Trust, Leniency and Deterrence
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - Konkurrensverket, Government of Sweden - 2014
several other forms of crimes that share cartels' strategic features, including corruption and nancial fraud. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277367
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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - 2008
: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320343
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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
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Cartels and bribes
Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. As in Dixit (2015, 2016), cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278155
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Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136460
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Cartels and bribes
Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. As in Dixit (2015, 2016), cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250
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Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion : an experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 68 (2019) 4, pp. 827-844
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012213132