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Limited credit records and market outcomes

Bottero, Margherita; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Banca d'Italia - 2013

. Interestingly, such data is typically erased from the public records after a number of years, in accordance with privacy protection …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099717

Memory and markets

Kovbasjuk, Sergej; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - In: The review of economic studies : RES 91 (2024) 3, pp. 1775-1806

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528702

The distortive effects of antitrust fines based on revenue

Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Bank of Greece - 2013

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696482

The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis - The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics and … - 2012

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010659952

The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408

Trust and Deterrence

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084601

Optimal leniency programs

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000

Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608606

Trust, Leniency and Deterrence

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - Konkurrensverket, Government of Sweden - 2014

This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment studying the channels through which dierent law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies oering immunity to the rst reporting party, a high ne is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong eect even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277367

The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis - 2012

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110649

Leniency, Collusion, Corruption, and Whistleblowing

Luz, Reinaldo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2016

Leniency policies offering immunity to the first cartel member that blows the whistle and self-reports to the antitrust … forms of leniency (or rewards) for unveiling corruption, a policy offering immunity from antitrust sanctions may not be … for corruption. This paper assesses the extent of this problem by describing and discussing the antitrust and anti …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110663