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We present results from a laboratory experiment identifying the main channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter organized economic crime. The absolute level of a fine has a strong deterrence effect, even when the exogenous probability of apprehension is zero. This effect...
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strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main …
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We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a … sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled with the non-disclosure of leniency statements and the insufficient … cartel convictions. Together with evidence on the current level of fines, this points at the need to introduce …
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We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. As in Dixit (2015, 2016), cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However,...
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cartel members and study the size of the contracts affected or potentially affected by the illegal activity, comparing them …
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I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151044