Double auctions with profit-motivated human traders as well as "zero-intelligence" programmed traders have previously been shown to converge to Pareto optimal allocations in partial equilibrium settings. We show that these results remain robust in two-good general equilibrium settings and...

The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walrus' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents'...

We consider a pure exchange economy repeated from a fixed endowment for an indefinite number of periods and posit a learning rule which directs convergence to competitive equilibrium. In each period trade converges to an allocation in the contract set, where agents interpret the current (common)...

The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walras' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents'...

The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walrus' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents'...

Double auctions with profit-motivated human traders as well as quot;zero-intelligencequot; programmed traders have previously been shown to converge to Pareto optimal allocations in partial equilibrium settings. We show that these results remain robust in two-good general equilibrium settings...

We consider a pure exchange economy repeated for an indefinite number of periods from a fixed endowment and posit a learning rule which directs convergence to competitive equilibrium. In each period trade converges to an allocation in the contract set, where agents interpret the current (common)...

Double auctions with profit-motivated human traders as well as quot;zero-intelligencequot; programmed traders have previously been shown to converge to Pareto optimal allocations in partial equilibrium settings. We show that these results remain robust in two-good general equilibrium settings...