Legalized parallel trade implies that an original manufacturer cannot control a retailer in a foreign country once the latter has ordered its sales quantity and has compensated the former. This paper endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent who has private information on the perceived...

Legalized parallel trade implies that an original manufacturer cannot control a retailer in a foreign country once the latter has ordered its sales quantity and has compensated the former. This paper endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent who has private information on the perceived...

Legalized parallel trade implies that an original manufacturer cannot control a retailer in a foreign country once the latter has ordered its sales quantity and has compensated the former. This paper endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent who has private information on the perceived...

We extend structural gravity models of bilateral trade flows to oligopolistic competition. We show that conventional gravity estimates do not only reflect trade costs but also market power. Our simple estimation procedure generalizes the standard gravity model and disentangles exogenous trade...

We extend structural gravity models of bilateral trade flows to oligopolistic competition. We show that conventional gravity estimates do not only reflect trade costs but also market power. Our simple estimation procedure generalizes the standard gravity model and disentangles exogenous trade...

We extend structural gravity models of bilateral trade flows to oligopolistic competition. We show that conventional gravity estimates do not only reflect trade costs but also market power. Our simple estimation procedure generalizes the standard gravity model and disentangles exogenous trade...

This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are asymmetric because the foreign firm...

This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are asymmetric because the foreign firm...

This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are asymmetric because the foreign firm...

This paper develops an efficiency theory of contingent trade policies. We model the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete information about production costs. The cost distributions are asymmetric because the foreign firm...