Final-offer arbitration in Major League Baseball provides an ideal setting for examining the empirical regularities that are associated with bargaining failure, since final offers, salaries, and player statistics, which provide the fundamental facts for the case, are all readily available. Using...

Much of the law and economics literature, including Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986), explains settlement failure in bargaining as a consequence of asymmetric information. An alternative, non-strategic explanation found in Shavell (1982) suggests that settlement failure stems from...

By examining an online computer exchange, we find that sellers who place higher nonbinding ask prices have higher outstanding offers and remain on the exchange longer, suggesting a willingness to hold out for higher offers. Additionally, higher ask prices deter buyers from making offers. The...

By examining an online computer exchange, we find that sellers who place higher nonbinding ask prices have higher outstanding offers and remain on the exchange longer, suggesting a willingness to hold out for higher offers. Additionally, higher ask prices deter buyers from making offers. The...