If some of the returns to migration accrue from return migration, the optimal duration of migration may be shorter than the feasible duration of migration. We develop a model that provides and highlights conditions under which return migration takes place even though a reversal of the...

In this paper we consider a population of would-be migrants in a developing country. To begin with, this population is divided into two sets: those who save by themselves to pay for the cost of their migration, and those who pool their savings with the savings of another would-be migrant to pay...

While the economic performance of migrants in the receiving country undoubtedly depends on qualifications, it is also affected by inclinations. Given the probability of return migration, we establish a behavioral link between the incentive of m igrants to save in their country of destination and...

In the model of Stark et al. (1997, 1998), the possibility of employment in a developed country raises the level of human capital acquired by workers in the developing country. We show that this result holds even when workers have the option to save. -- Human capital formation ; Savings ;...

In the model of Stark et al. (1997, 1998), the possibility of employment in a developed country raises the level of human capital acquired by workers in the developing country. We show that this result holds even when workers have the option to save. -- Human capital formation ; Savings ;...

In the model of Stark et al. (1997, 1998), the possibility of employment in a developed country raises the level of human capital acquired by workers in the developing country. We show that this result holds even when workers have the option to save

If some of the returns to migration accrue from return migration, the optimal duration of migration may be shorter than the feasible duration of migration. We develop a model that provides and highlights conditions under which return migration takes place even though a reversal of the inter-...