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Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Kováč, Eugen - 2010

Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and … reversibility option on the coordination outcome. Such an option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and we … determine the direction of the effect based only on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150714

Tractable dynamic global games and applications

Mathevet, Laurent; Steiner, Jakub - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2583-2619

We present a family of tractable dynamic global games and its applications. Agents privately learn about a fixed fundamental, and repeatedly adjust their investments while facing frictions. The game exhibits many externalities: payoffs may depend on the volume of investment, on its volatility,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719011

Contagion through learning

Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 4, pp. 431-458

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599409

Contagion through learning

Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 4, pp. 431-458

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700119

Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Kovac, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369079

Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems

Kovac, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008

Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncertain about actions of their fellow players and … reversibility option on the coordination outcome. Such an option can either enhance or hamper ecient coordination, and we determine … the direction of the effect based only on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086646

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

Sakovics, Jozsef; Steiner, Jakub - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2009

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-fulfilling coordination failure and hence is … project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small benefits invest only if their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036061

A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms

Steiner, Jakub - In: Economics Bulletin 8 (2007) 1, pp. 1-4

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181937

A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms

Steiner, Jakub - In: Economics Bulletin 8 (2007) 1, pp. 1-4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629933

Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems

Kováč, Eugen; Steiner, Jakub - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 298-320

We study a dynamic coordination process in which agents are uncertain about the actions of their fellow agents, and … important strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and … we characterize the direction of the effect based solely on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049901