We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation andequilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determinedby a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion betweenthe high-skilled and low-skilled workers...

We study both the various consequences and the incentives of outsourcing. We argue thatthe wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of the share of outsourcing,which is importantly a result consistent with existing empirical research...

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with...

We study both the various consequences and the incentives of outsourcing. We argue that the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of the share of outsourcing, which is importantly a result consistent with existing empirical research. Furthermore, we show that a production...

We study the effects of labour market imperfections and the capital stock on equilibrium unemployment. With an exogenous capital-labour ratio, stronger labour market imperfections promote equilibrium unemployment. However, the relationship between the long-run unemployment and the capital stock...

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds...

We study the implications of product and labor market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment under both exogenous and endogenous capital intensity. With endogenous capital intensity, stronger labor market imperfections always increase equilibrium unemployment. The relationship between the...