The ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once. A model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods. When the uncertainty is small....

Previous work which showed that prices could aggregate perfectly the diverse information of traders depended critically on the assumption that all agents had constant absolute risk utility. We show that either all agents must have constant absolute risk aversion utility, or all must have...

The ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once. A model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods. When the uncertainty is small....

Previous work which showed that prices could aggregate perfectly the diverse information of traders depended critically on the assumption that all agents had constant absolute risk utility. We show that either all agents must have constant absolute risk aversion utility, or all must have...