This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market...

This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market...

Financial institutions form multi-layer networks of contracts among each other and exposures to common assets. As a result, the default probability of one institution depends on the default probability of all the other institutions in the network. Here, we show how small errors on the knowledge...

We explore the properties of a credit network characterized by inside credit - i.e. credit relationships connecting downstream (D) and upstream (U) firms - and outside credit - i.e. credit relationships connecting firms and banks. The structure of the network changes over time due to the...