This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market...

This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market...

This paper presents certain results, of remarkable simplicity, concerning the market allocation of resources of research and development (R&D) and its comparison to socially efficient allocations. In contrast to many previous studies, we posit that a firm can undertake more than one project (at...

In an earlier paper, we showed that the value of shadow prices depends on how the government contemplates re- equilibrating the economy to the perturbation associated with any project, except in the extreme case where the government has chosen all policy instruments optimally. Only under...