This paper investigates the existence and nature of equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under adverse … contrast, the Akerlof price equilibrium described a situation where the insurance firm has no information about sales to a … particular individual. We show that with more plausible information assumptions - no insurance firm has full information but at …

when firms offer "price contracts" which allow clients to purchase as much insurance as they wish at the quoted prices. We … effort, full insurance ii) positive profit price equilibrium - positive profit, positive effort, partial insurance iii) zero … insurance price equilibrium - zero insurance, zero profit, positive effort. We also demonstrate circumstances under which the …

This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an … individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance … purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance purchases are observable, each firm will ration the amount of insurance its …

This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing …-risk type gets more stringent (i.e. when low risk individuals shirk with lower levels of insurance). We also show that a pooling … accident probability) or when the provision of insurance is non-exclusive (i.e. individuals can purchase insurance from more …