This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market...

This paper examines the dynamic consequences of a greater centralization or decentralization of the decision-making authority to appoint successor managers on the quality of managers actually appointed. Our main result is that a greater centralization results in a greater variability over time...

This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market...

This paper examines optimal decision making under three different organizational forms: committees, hierarchies and polyarchies. Our focus is on the trade-off between errors of rejecting good projects versus errors of accepting bad projects, and on the trade-off between gains from more extensive...

Learning, industrial, and technology polices : an overview / Akbar Noman and Joseph E. Stiglitz -- Theoretical and conceptual foundations -- Industrial policies in learning economies / Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi and Joseph Stiglitz -- Dynamic efficiency : structural dynamics and economic growth...