Progress in artificial intelligence and related forms of automation technologies threatens to reverse the gains that developing countries and emerging markets have experienced from integrating into the world economy over the past half century, aggravating poverty and inequality. The new...

We study insurance markets with nonexclusive contracts, introducing bilateral endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under remarkably mild conditions, and characterize the unique equilibrium...

We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to...

What can explain the large changes in aggregate demand that occur in the absence of any seemingly corresponding shock to the underlying state variables of the economy? We show that macroeconomic volatility can arise from dispersions of beliefs among agents. These dispersions give rise to bets...

This paper shows how recent developments in the Economics of Information can provide insights into economic relations in less developed countries, and how they can provide explanations for institutions which, in neoclassical theory, appear anomalous and/or inefficient. Sharecropping and other...

Schumpeter argued that economic downturns had positive effects, in the incentives that it provided for firms to increase their efficiency. Part 1. provides a simple model confirming Schwnpeter's insight At thesame time, the model shows that there are real costs to economic fluctuations which...

This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance...

We present a model of the labor market with asymmetric information in which the equilibrium of the' market generates unemployment and job queues so that wages may serve as an effective screening device. This happens because more productive workers -- within any group of individuals with a given...