An international oligopoly model with unionised and non-unionised firms is constructed to make predictions about the pattern of international mergers.

This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically.

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour incom. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a 'good jobs' sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions.

We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the...

In the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest.