Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 91
Cover Image
What are the Costs of Weakening Shareholder Primacy? Evidence from a U.S. Quasi-Natural Experiment
Bennett, Benjamin; Stulz, René M.; Wang, Zexi - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2025
We study the consequences of weakening shareholder primacy using Nevada Senate Bill 203 as a quasi-natural experiment. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that, instead of improving their governance in response to the Bill to reassure capital providers, affected firms experience a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015409860
Cover Image
The U.S. Listing Gap
Doidge, Craig - 2015
The U.S. had 14% fewer exchange-listed firms in 2012 than in 1975. Relative to other countries, the U.S. now has abnormally few listed firms given its level of development and the quality of its institutions. We call this the “U.S. listing gap” and investigate possible explanations for it....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022772
Cover Image
Why Did Some Banks Perform Better during the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation
Beltratti, Andrea - 2010
the crisis. Banks that the market favored in 2006 had especially poor returns during the crisis. Using conventional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013152303
Cover Image
Why do bank boards have risk committees?
Stulz, René M.; Tompkins, James; Williamson, Rohan; … - 2021
We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012816376
Cover Image
Firm rigidities and the decline in growth opportunities
Loderer, Claudio; Stulz, René M.; Waelchli, Urs - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 63 (2017) 9, pp. 3000-3020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011748885
Cover Image
Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation
Beltratti, Andrea; Stulz, René M. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009
the crisis. Banks that the market favored in 2006 had especially poor returns during the crisis. Using conventional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061603
Cover Image
Corporate Governance and the Home Bias
Dahlquist, Magnus; Pinkowitz, Lee; Stulz, René M.; … - Institute for Financial Research (SIFR) - 2002
from the world market portfolio. In regression explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float … portfolio has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result … holds when we control for country characteristics. An analysis of foreign investor holdings at the firm level for Sweden …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651570
Cover Image
Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?
Karolyi, G. Andrew; Doidge, Craig; Stulz, René M. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008
This paper investigates Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) deregistrations by foreign firms from the time the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002 through 2008. We test two theories, the bonding theory and the loss of competitiveness theory, to understand why foreign firms leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718297
Cover Image
Do Target CEOs Sell Out Their Shareholders to Keep Their Job in a Merger?
Bargeron, Leonce L.; Schlingemann, Frederik P.; Stulz, … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009
CEOs have a potential conflict of interest when their company is acquired: they can bargain to be retained by the acquirer and for private benefits rather than for a higher premium to be paid to the shareholders. We investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005722998
Cover Image
The Dark Side of Outside Directors: Do they Quit When They are Most Needed?
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Low, Angie; Stulz, René M. - 2010
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922917