-1994, 2005-2014) and differ in bank regulations, especially concerning capital requirements and enforcement. In contrast to the … forces beyond formal regulations incentivize bank managers to deleverage when their banks are in distress …

-1994, 2005-2014) and differ in bank regulations, especially concerning capital requirements and enforcement. In contrast to the … forces beyond formal regulations incentivize bank managers to deleverage when their banks are in distress …

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is …, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less …. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis …

The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage …, moral hazard incentives dominate distressed bank leverage and risk-taking policies …