Executive compensation has increased dramatically in recent times, but so has trading volume and individual investor access to financial markets. We provide a model in which some managers obfuscate financial statements in order to extract additional compensation. Owing to a lack of...

We explore the optimal timing of voluntary disclosures by firms. By delaying disclosure of a signal, firms encourage the acquisition of correlated signals by reducing informed investors' exposure to the long-term risk of holding the asset. Immediate disclosure reduces rents from acquiring the...

We develop a model where overconfident investors overestimate their own signal quality but are skeptical of others'. Those investors who are initially uninformed believe that the early informed have learned little, leading the former investors to provide excess liquidity, which, in turn, causes...

We document asymmetric announcement effects of consumer sentiment news on United States stock and stock futures markets. While a negative market effect occurs upon the release of bad sentiment news, there is no market reaction for the counterpart good news. This supports the “negativity...

We document asymmetric announcement effects of consumer sentiment news on United States stock and stock futures markets. While a negative market effect occurs upon the release of bad sentiment news, there is no market reaction for the counterpart good news. This supports the “negativity...

We provide a synthesis of the empirical evidence on market liquidity. The liquidity measurement literature has established standard measures of liquidity that apply to broad categories of market microstructure data. Specialized measures of liquidity have been developed to deal with data...