Showing 1 - 10 of 155
cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex … value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824091
We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014146018
It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility … is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on … totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147814
costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on … associated games do not occur. The main axioms for the core and the nucleolus are consistency properties based on the reduced …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019777
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087342
In 1985 Aumann axiomatized the Shapley NTU value by non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that, when replacing unanimity by “unanimity for the grand coalition” and translation covariance, these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049721
In 1985 Aumann axiomatized the Shapley NTU value by non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that, when replacing unanimity by "unanimity for the grand coalition" and translation covariance, these axioms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010562394
We show that neither Peleg's nor Tadenuma's well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual … balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845663
A balanced transferable utility game (N, v) has a stable core if its core is externally stable, that is, if each … imputation that is not in the core is dominated by some core element. Given two payoff allocations x and y, we say that x … outvoting coincides with the core if and only if the game has a stable core. By applying the duality theorem of linear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012831209
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection … core. Replacing "poorest" by "poorer" allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, strengthening core selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836827