We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection … core. Replacing "poorest" by "poorer" allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, strengthening core selection …

cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex … value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of …

It is known that for supermodular TU-games, the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains …, obtained by minimizing or maximizing in a given order the coordinates of a core element. We give a simple formula which does …, and show that there exist balanced games whose core has vertices which are not min-max vertices if and only if n > 4 …

A balanced transferable utility game (N, v) has a stable core if its core is externally stable, that is, if each … imputation that is not in the core is dominated by some core element. Given two payoff allocations x and y, we say that x … outvoting coincides with the core if and only if the game has a stable core. By applying the duality theorem of linear …

We show that neither Peleg's nor Tadenuma's well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual … balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative …

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …

It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility … is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on … totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other …

bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell. We prove that the egalitarian solution is the unique core selection that … satisfies AM and bounded richness, requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing “poorest …

is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an …