Showing 1 - 10 of 119
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225867
increment of the worth of the grand coalition according to fCE. We show that the set of Pareto optimal single-valued solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843038
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing "poorest" by "poorer" allows to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836827
We show that the constrained egalitarian surplus-sharing rule, which divides the surplus so that the poorer players' resulting payoffs become equal but not larger than any remaining player's status quo payoff, is characterized by Pareto optimality, path independence, both well-known, and less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890329
This paper formally introduces Hart-Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824091
It is known that for supermodular TU-games, the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains true for games where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice. Such games are induced by a hierarchy (partial order) on players. We propose a larger class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984412
is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040545
outvotes y via some coalition S of a feasible set if x dominates y via S and x allocates at least v(T) to any feasible T that …-stable core if each payoff vector that allocates less than v(S) to some coalition S is dominated by some core element and prove … that core super-stability is equivalent to vital extendability, requiring that each vital coalition is extendable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012831209
We show that neither Peleg's nor Tadenuma's well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845663
Two preimputations of a given TU game can be compared via the Lorenz order applied to the vectors of satisfactions. One preimputation is 'socially more desirable' than the other, if its corresponding vector of satisfactions Lorenz dominates the satisfaction vector with respect to the second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221788