​We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders...

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to examine how managerial ability affects corporate tax aggressiveness.Design/methodology/approachThe study follows the work of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) and quantifies managerial ability by calculating how efficiently managers generate revenues from given...

​We show that firms led by politically partisan CEOs are associated with a higher level of corporate tax sheltering than firms led by nonpartisan CEOs. Specifically, Republican CEOs are associated with more corporate tax sheltering even when their wealth is not tied with that of shareholders...

We examine firm's cash holdings from the perspective of the agency cost of debt and find that firms with outstanding loans hold significantly less cash than firms without outstanding loans. This relationship is particularly stronger in financially constrained firms with higher hedging needs,...

We find a negative relationship between managerial ability and tax aggressiveness. The result is robust to a wide range of measures of tax aggressiveness, inclusion of firm fixed effects, and the use of a difference-in-differences approach using information regarding CEO turnover to control for...

This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on bank loan contracting. We find that firms with higher ability managers obtain more favorable loan contract terms, such as lower loan spreads, less stringent covenants, and longer term maturity. Furthermore, the negative relation between...